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جان بِرنِت متخصص بسیار برجستهٔ افلاطون و یونانی‌شناسی در حواشیش بر مکالمهٔ اِوْثوفرُن افلاطون، منکر وجود کاربرد حالت شخصی دایمنین در یونان قدیم شده و گفته این تعبیر خلاصهٔ «نشانهٔ الهی» (آیه؟) است پس نه موجودی با هویت شخصی بلکه تنها نشانه‌هایی بر سقراط درمی‌آمده…

τὸ δαιμόνιον . . . σαυτῷ . . . γίγνεσθαι. See Ap. 31 c 8 sqq. with the notes.* The only strict parallel in Plato to this quasi-substantival use of τὸ δαιμόνιον for the 'divine sign', if we except Ap. 40 a 4 (where see note), is Theaet. 151 a 4 τὸ γιγνομενον δαιμόνιον. That clearly means the divine something (divinum quiddam, Cic. de Div. i. § 122) that comes to me', and so we must understand the words here. There is no such noun-substantive as δαιμόνιον in classical Greek. That makes its first appearance in the Septuagint, where it is pretty clearly a diminutive of δαίμων rather than the neuter of δαιμόνιος. The regular use of γίγνεσθαι in this connexion proves that the 'divine something' is not a 'genius' or familiar spirit of any kind, as it was supposed to have been in later days. The 'sign' is never called a δαίμων, though the idea of the δαίμων as a guardian spirit was quite familiar (cf. my note on Phaedo 107d 6 with Rep. 617 e 1 and 620d 8). It always remains strictly impersonal. It comes from God, but it is not a 'divinity' of any kind. Characteristic ways of speaking are Ap. 31c 8 ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται, Euthyd. 272 e 3 ἐγένετο τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον, Phaedr. 242 b 8 τὸ δαιμόνιόν τε καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον μοι γίγνεσθαι ἐγένετο. It is also to be observed that Socrates is always represented by Plato (though not, of course, by Xenophon) as speaking quite lightly, and even ironically, of the 'divine sign'. It belonged to the 'irrational part' of his soul, even more than dreams (cf. Crito 44 a 6), which sometimes did give positive instructions (Phaed. 6o e I sqq.) as the 31 d 3). That being so, it is obviously futile to rationalize it. We must simply accept the fact that it was a perfectly real experience to Socrates, though not apparently of paramount importance. It served to justify certain instinctive reluctances of which he was unable to give a clear account (λόγον διδόναι) to himself. But he believed in it all the same, and actually heard the 'voice' (Ap. 31 d 3 n.).
See H. Jackson, 'The δαιμόνιον σημείον of Socrates' (J. Phil. v. 232), and, for a careful examination of Xenophon's usage, Macnaghten in C.R. xxviii. 185. On δαιμόνιον as a substantive in Hellenistic Greek (LXX, N.T., and magical papyri) see Dibelius, Die Geisterwelt im Glauben des Paulus (1909), pp. 225 sqq. Tertullian is doubtless right in saying that this δαιμόνιον is a diminutive of δαίμων cf. the passage quoted in the Thesaurus s.v. daemonium). It is used of evil spirits and of the gods of the heathen (so I Cor. 10: 20), and is the origin of the modern 'demon'.

*) γίγνεται, comes to me', the regular word in speaking of the 'divine sign'. Cf. Euth. 3 b 5 n.

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63 viewsمحمد نورالهی, Nov 12 at 03:27

τὸ δαιμόνιον . . . σαυτῷ . . . γίγνεσθαι. See Ap. 31 c 8 sqq. with the notes.* The only strict parallel in Plato to this quasi-substantival use of τὸ δαιμόνιον for the 'divine sign', if we except Ap. 40 a 4 (where see note), is Theaet. 151 a 4 τὸ γιγνομενον δαιμόνιον. That clearly means the divine something (divinum quiddam, Cic. de Div. i. § 122) that comes to me', and so we must understand the words here. There is no such noun-substantive as δαιμόνιον in classical Greek. That makes its first appearance in the Septuagint, where it is pretty clearly a diminutive of δαίμων rather than the neuter of δαιμόνιος. The regular use of γίγνεσθαι in this connexion proves that the 'divine something' is not a 'genius' or familiar spirit of any kind, as it was supposed to have been in later days. The 'sign' is never called a δαίμων, though the idea of the δαίμων as a guardian spirit was quite familiar (cf. my note on Phaedo 107d 6 with Rep. 617 e 1 and 620d 8). It always remains strictly impersonal. It comes from God, but it is not a 'divinity' of any kind. Characteristic ways of speaking are Ap. 31c 8 ὅτι μοι θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον γίγνεται, Euthyd. 272 e 3 ἐγένετο τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον, Phaedr. 242 b 8 τὸ δαιμόνιόν τε καὶ τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον μοι γίγνεσθαι ἐγένετο. It is also to be observed that Socrates is always represented by Plato (though not, of course, by Xenophon) as speaking quite lightly, and even ironically, of the 'divine sign'. It belonged to the 'irrational part' of his soul, even more than dreams (cf. Crito 44 a 6), which sometimes did give positive instructions (Phaed. 6o e I sqq.) as the 31 d 3). That being so, it is obviously futile to rationalize it. We must simply accept the fact that it was a perfectly real experience to Socrates, though not apparently of paramount importance. It served to justify certain instinctive reluctances of which he was unable to give a clear account (λόγον διδόναι) to himself. But he believed in it all the same, and actually heard the 'voice' (Ap. 31 d 3 n.).
See H. Jackson, 'The δαιμόνιον σημείον of Socrates' (J. Phil. v. 232), and, for a careful examination of Xenophon's usage, Macnaghten in C.R. xxviii. 185. On δαιμόνιον as a substantive in Hellenistic Greek (LXX, N.T., and magical papyri) see Dibelius, Die Geisterwelt im Glauben des Paulus (1909), pp. 225 sqq. Tertullian is doubtless right in saying that this δαιμόνιον is a diminutive of δαίμων cf. the passage quoted in the Thesaurus s.v. daemonium). It is used of evil spirits and of the gods of the heathen (so I Cor. 10: 20), and is the origin of the modern 'demon'.

*) γίγνεται, comes to me', the regular word in speaking of the 'divine sign'. Cf. Euth. 3 b 5 n.

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