A few hours ago, ten rockets were launched from the Deir Al-Balah area of central Gaza towards the Israeli city of Ashdod, approximately 50km from the launch points.
At least 5 of the rockets impacted various parts of the city, with three injuries reported among Israelis.
At least 5 of the rockets impacted various parts of the city, with three injuries reported among Israelis.
AMK Mapping
A few hours ago, ten rockets were launched from the Deir Al-Balah area of central Gaza towards the Israeli city of Ashdod, approximately 50km from the launch points. At least 5 of the rockets impacted various parts of the city, with three injuries reported…
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A couple of hours later, the Israeli Air Force conducted an airstrike on the reported rocket launchers in Deir Al-Balah, central Gaza.
Evacuation orders were issued for parts of the city.
Evacuation orders were issued for parts of the city.
Forwarded from Masno
Well, one of the businesses in Sumy that was destroyed last night 100% was not a military target because I know the owner and I visited his factory regularly to buy some fish.
The irony is that he is Russian speaking, and refused to speak Ukrainian, and also employed over 50 people. Millions of $$$$$ destroyed.
The irony is that he is Russian speaking, and refused to speak Ukrainian, and also employed over 50 people. Millions of $$$$$ destroyed.
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Ukraine launching MLRS (Likely HIMARS) from/near residential neighbourhoods of Sumy City.
Forwarded from AMK Mapping EXTRA
Al-Jazeera correspondent in Gaza: "A journalist was killed and others were injured after a journalists' tent was bombed near the Nasser Medical Complex in Khan Yunis, Southern Gaza."
After approximately 72 days of battles, Russian forces have made one final push and captured the village of Uspenivka on the western flank of Pokrovsk.
The full capture of this village does not rule out the possibility of future Ukrainian counterattacks where they re-enter the village, however for now it is under full Russian control.
Pre-war population: ~419
The full capture of this village does not rule out the possibility of future Ukrainian counterattacks where they re-enter the village, however for now it is under full Russian control.
Pre-war population: ~419
Russian forces advanced for nearly 3.5 km and have reached the large lithium deposit east of Shevchenko, Komar direction, Donetsk Oblast.
From my twitter:
"What we see in this war is one side being reckless in the attacks (most of the time), and the other being careful in their attacks (most of the time). This is - of course - for a number of reasons, many of which are unavoidable for Ukraine. I will get into those a little further down in this post.
Ukraine conducts these ridiculously planned, doomed-to-fail, operations such as what we've seen in Toretsk, Kursk, Belgorod, Solone, Kotlyne, etc, however there have been more careful counterattacks, like what we saw in Udachne and Uspenivka.
Russia does much more well-planned, careful, and more-likely-to-succeed operations, such as what we've seen in the final stages of Avdiivka, the offensive southwest of Pokrovsk, the Ocheretyne breakthrough, etc, however there have been more reckless attacks such as the initial Terny and Avdiivka offensives, as well as the new mechanised assault west of Andriivka.
There are other issues of course, such as the whole structure of the two militaries, with Ukraine lacking Division-level staff with experienced brigade commanders and staff officers. Also, Ukraine has only just recently started transitioning from a largely brigade-level system to an Army corps system. Army corps systems allow commanders to better focus on their troops and distributes the management load more efficiently. Of course, there are numerous other benefits (which I won't get into), but the main point I'm making is that Ukraine didn't enjoy these benefits during these reckless operations.
There is also the fact that Ukraine detaches and patches units together which results in a lack of adequate coordination, further undermining these operations and making them even more unsuccessful and costly.
And of course, the lack of training and motivated soldiers is a major drawback. With Ukraine lacking manpower, they feel the need to conduct training as fast as possible, which leads to missed knowledge by the new troops and many other issues which are sure to arise later on in terrible forms for the AFU.
The way in which mobilisation is conducted also plays a major role, as it is forced, and men are often beaten up by TCC (mobilisation) officers before being sent to training centres. Its self-explanatory why this is in no way adequate for motivated troops who fight well.
The above point on manpower also means that the Ukrainian command doesn't have the time for long periods of breaks for worn out and exhausted brigades where replenishment, reconstitution, regrouping and mobilisation to patch up said brigade should take place on a widespread and properly conducted way. Brigades should have one year allocated for this process, although this can be shortened to six months during wartime if necessary. This has not been happening in Ukraine, once again - because of the lack of manpower on the frontlines and in the rear.
Russia on the other hand has the manpower, firepower, airpower and overall time advantages against Ukraine. They can keep up the war of attrition for a long time, meaning that they have the time to plan operations and offensives, conduct them thoroughly and successfully, and have the necessary military structure and leadership qualities to ensure eventual success, even if it does take some time (which many incorrectly associate with a lack of success).
Of course, Russia has their reckless commanders who are stuck in the past and believe that it is somehow a great idea to send 18 tanks and other armoured vehicles down a 4km stretch of open road with no cover, little to no electronic warfare and with the expectation that they will somehow reach the next village without being chewed down by swarms of Ukrainian FPV drones. But overall, their commanders and higher-up command are largely smarter and correctly view this war as a war of attrition, know that they have the theatre-wide advantage, and don't get impatient with slow, or even no progress."
"What we see in this war is one side being reckless in the attacks (most of the time), and the other being careful in their attacks (most of the time). This is - of course - for a number of reasons, many of which are unavoidable for Ukraine. I will get into those a little further down in this post.
Ukraine conducts these ridiculously planned, doomed-to-fail, operations such as what we've seen in Toretsk, Kursk, Belgorod, Solone, Kotlyne, etc, however there have been more careful counterattacks, like what we saw in Udachne and Uspenivka.
Russia does much more well-planned, careful, and more-likely-to-succeed operations, such as what we've seen in the final stages of Avdiivka, the offensive southwest of Pokrovsk, the Ocheretyne breakthrough, etc, however there have been more reckless attacks such as the initial Terny and Avdiivka offensives, as well as the new mechanised assault west of Andriivka.
There are other issues of course, such as the whole structure of the two militaries, with Ukraine lacking Division-level staff with experienced brigade commanders and staff officers. Also, Ukraine has only just recently started transitioning from a largely brigade-level system to an Army corps system. Army corps systems allow commanders to better focus on their troops and distributes the management load more efficiently. Of course, there are numerous other benefits (which I won't get into), but the main point I'm making is that Ukraine didn't enjoy these benefits during these reckless operations.
There is also the fact that Ukraine detaches and patches units together which results in a lack of adequate coordination, further undermining these operations and making them even more unsuccessful and costly.
And of course, the lack of training and motivated soldiers is a major drawback. With Ukraine lacking manpower, they feel the need to conduct training as fast as possible, which leads to missed knowledge by the new troops and many other issues which are sure to arise later on in terrible forms for the AFU.
The way in which mobilisation is conducted also plays a major role, as it is forced, and men are often beaten up by TCC (mobilisation) officers before being sent to training centres. Its self-explanatory why this is in no way adequate for motivated troops who fight well.
The above point on manpower also means that the Ukrainian command doesn't have the time for long periods of breaks for worn out and exhausted brigades where replenishment, reconstitution, regrouping and mobilisation to patch up said brigade should take place on a widespread and properly conducted way. Brigades should have one year allocated for this process, although this can be shortened to six months during wartime if necessary. This has not been happening in Ukraine, once again - because of the lack of manpower on the frontlines and in the rear.
Russia on the other hand has the manpower, firepower, airpower and overall time advantages against Ukraine. They can keep up the war of attrition for a long time, meaning that they have the time to plan operations and offensives, conduct them thoroughly and successfully, and have the necessary military structure and leadership qualities to ensure eventual success, even if it does take some time (which many incorrectly associate with a lack of success).
Of course, Russia has their reckless commanders who are stuck in the past and believe that it is somehow a great idea to send 18 tanks and other armoured vehicles down a 4km stretch of open road with no cover, little to no electronic warfare and with the expectation that they will somehow reach the next village without being chewed down by swarms of Ukrainian FPV drones. But overall, their commanders and higher-up command are largely smarter and correctly view this war as a war of attrition, know that they have the theatre-wide advantage, and don't get impatient with slow, or even no progress."
Forwarded from Kalibrated (Scott)
A major theme I see throughout online armchair analysis is tendency to view current events that are unfolding in a recent historical context. The “it was so it will be”type of thinking. This approach makes sense in times of relative stability, where variables are more predictable. The post Cold War world order (1991-2020s) is the perfect example of this. You have a rather uncontested hegemonic empire driving global events to suit their interests.
I for one believe that this era could soon, or has already come to an end. If this is the case then speculation and predictions based off an old framework will lead to miscalculations. This applies to economics as well, the stock market of ten years ago is under completely different circumstances than the stock market of today. When administrations have war plans behind closed doors, their public actions may seem wildly illogical or contradictory to what one would assume they should do.
Expect the unexpected, it’s a different world we’re living in now.
I for one believe that this era could soon, or has already come to an end. If this is the case then speculation and predictions based off an old framework will lead to miscalculations. This applies to economics as well, the stock market of ten years ago is under completely different circumstances than the stock market of today. When administrations have war plans behind closed doors, their public actions may seem wildly illogical or contradictory to what one would assume they should do.
Expect the unexpected, it’s a different world we’re living in now.
It's starting to look like we won't see many more Houthi ballistic missile attacks on Israel. The U.S. airstrikes seem to be taking its toll on them. Its been 8 days since the last one...
This is just as I got some really good sources on live tracking of the missiles though 😔
Maybe that means the next one is overdue and we will see one imminently?
This is just as I got some really good sources on live tracking of the missiles though 😔
Maybe that means the next one is overdue and we will see one imminently?
I have some new info on the new Ukrainian tactical sign (now signs) in the Lyman and Chasiv Yar direction, and it could suggest that a series of counterattacks are going to occur at some point.
First and foremost, it turns out that there is not just one new tactical sign, but actually two. This means that there are two new tactical groups in this direction, these being the square with two arrows, and the square with three arrows (the names have not been released yet).
The square with two arrows (which I will call 2A) is likely headquartered in Slovyansk, and parts of it are
already moving to Lyman. I have put on the map my best guess for their deployment area; however, they are likely deployed quite thin as there are apparently less of them than the other tactical group (which I will call 3A). It is possible that I have drawn the green "deployment" line too far north, and that the main concentration of troops will be south of the Siversky Donets River, mainly in the Siversk salient. For now, the northern part of that "deployment" is a possibility.
As for 3A, they are likely headquartered in Kramatorsk. No large-scale movements of 3A towards Chasiv Yar has been observed yet, but they are some forces of some battalions moving from Izyum, through Slovyansk, to Kramatorsk. Once again, I won't specify the names of the brigades for safety reasons, but up to two battalions of one fairly large brigade were seen in Slovyansk yesterday morning, and part of another brigade also moved through the city at roughly the same time, probably going to Kramatorsk.
(By the way, the map is in no way representative of reality, and is based off very limited information and estimations).
First and foremost, it turns out that there is not just one new tactical sign, but actually two. This means that there are two new tactical groups in this direction, these being the square with two arrows, and the square with three arrows (the names have not been released yet).
The square with two arrows (which I will call 2A) is likely headquartered in Slovyansk, and parts of it are
already moving to Lyman. I have put on the map my best guess for their deployment area; however, they are likely deployed quite thin as there are apparently less of them than the other tactical group (which I will call 3A). It is possible that I have drawn the green "deployment" line too far north, and that the main concentration of troops will be south of the Siversky Donets River, mainly in the Siversk salient. For now, the northern part of that "deployment" is a possibility.
As for 3A, they are likely headquartered in Kramatorsk. No large-scale movements of 3A towards Chasiv Yar has been observed yet, but they are some forces of some battalions moving from Izyum, through Slovyansk, to Kramatorsk. Once again, I won't specify the names of the brigades for safety reasons, but up to two battalions of one fairly large brigade were seen in Slovyansk yesterday morning, and part of another brigade also moved through the city at roughly the same time, probably going to Kramatorsk.
(By the way, the map is in no way representative of reality, and is based off very limited information and estimations).
Last night was a very quiet night for Russian Geran-2 drones. Only around 12 drones were launched.
4 flew to Druzhkivka (Donetsk Oblast)
3 flew to Kramatorsk (Donetsk Oblast)
1 flew to Kostyantynivka (Donetsk Oblast)
3 flew to Izyum (Kharkiv Oblast)
1 flew to Barinkove (Kharkiv Oblast)
4 explosions were reported in Druzhkivka, 3 in Kramatorsk, and 1 outside Izyum.
4 flew to Druzhkivka (Donetsk Oblast)
3 flew to Kramatorsk (Donetsk Oblast)
1 flew to Kostyantynivka (Donetsk Oblast)
3 flew to Izyum (Kharkiv Oblast)
1 flew to Barinkove (Kharkiv Oblast)
4 explosions were reported in Druzhkivka, 3 in Kramatorsk, and 1 outside Izyum.
1 Russian Su-34 departed from Baltimore Air Base in Voronezh Oblast. It is flying in the direction of Kursk Oblast, possibly to launch Kh-31P cruise missiles.