Инсайты Матвеева Insights of Matveev

⚠️My comments on the recent decisions of the new Syrian authorities to appoint al-Sharaa as President of the transitional period, the abolition of the 2012 Constitution, and the dissolution of the People's Council (parliament) together with the army and special services.

Almost all these decisions, including even the dissolution of the army, will hardly provoke a sharp escalation of tensions. Syria is not Egypt: Since Hafez Assad's presidency, the army, excluding the generals, Republican Guard, and maybe the contingent in Lebanon (1976-2005), has belonged neither the sub-elite of the local society nor wealthy classes.

Remarkably, the situation has not changed during the conflict. Although several materially motivated special forces' regiments were formed, among them General Suheil al-Hassan's "Tiger Force," many officers and soldiers still "fought their war" by inspecting people and cargo at checkpoints.

Contrary to stereotypes, the Syrian army remained mostly Sunni, with just some of its elite units led by Alawites, namely, Maher Assad or Suheil al-Hasan. Naturally, in 2011-2013, desertion from the army to the opposition camp was massive.

Yet, the decision to dissolve the special services hides very high risks of not just an escalation but a new turn of the bloody civil war. Assad's Syria was rightfully considered a "country of special services," whose employees were a privileged part of the society and the commanders belonged not only to the sub-elite, but even the elite (General Ali Mamlyuk, before him General Ali Duba, and others) with own business assets and economic interests.

Those interests could not be ignored by the Assads, who logically considered the special services and not the army or the Baath party as the backbone of the regime! Not by chance, under Hafez Assad, special services were recruited not from Sunnis, but Alawites, and in some cases from the relatives and friendly clans, such as Al-Qalbiya. Thus, the French mandate tradition of recruiting local security forces from minorities was reanimated.

Without ensuring in advance a full integration of the Assads' special services into the new power structures (which is difficult, because most of those people still support the Assads, if not Bashar then his brother Maher, amidst the mere time deficit), al-Sharaa risks to provoke large-scale riots in the places of compact residence of the Alawites. They are located in the provinces of Latakia, Tartus, and the western part of the province of Homs. In the first half of 2025, such developments could seriously aggravate the territorial, political, and economic split of the country.❓

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⚠️My comments on the recent decisions of the new Syrian authorities to appoint al-Sharaa as President of the transitional period, the abolition of the 2012 Constitution, and the dissolution of the People's Council (parliament) together with the army and special services.

Almost all these decisions, including even the dissolution of the army, will hardly provoke a sharp escalation of tensions. Syria is not Egypt: Since Hafez Assad's presidency, the army, excluding the generals, Republican Guard, and maybe the contingent in Lebanon (1976-2005), has belonged neither the sub-elite of the local society nor wealthy classes.

Remarkably, the situation has not changed during the conflict. Although several materially motivated special forces' regiments were formed, among them General Suheil al-Hassan's "Tiger Force," many officers and soldiers still "fought their war" by inspecting people and cargo at checkpoints.

Contrary to stereotypes, the Syrian army remained mostly Sunni, with just some of its elite units led by Alawites, namely, Maher Assad or Suheil al-Hasan. Naturally, in 2011-2013, desertion from the army to the opposition camp was massive.

Yet, the decision to dissolve the special services hides very high risks of not just an escalation but a new turn of the bloody civil war. Assad's Syria was rightfully considered a "country of special services," whose employees were a privileged part of the society and the commanders belonged not only to the sub-elite, but even the elite (General Ali Mamlyuk, before him General Ali Duba, and others) with own business assets and economic interests.

Those interests could not be ignored by the Assads, who logically considered the special services and not the army or the Baath party as the backbone of the regime! Not by chance, under Hafez Assad, special services were recruited not from Sunnis, but Alawites, and in some cases from the relatives and friendly clans, such as Al-Qalbiya. Thus, the French mandate tradition of recruiting local security forces from minorities was reanimated.

Without ensuring in advance a full integration of the Assads' special services into the new power structures (which is difficult, because most of those people still support the Assads, if not Bashar then his brother Maher, amidst the mere time deficit), al-Sharaa risks to provoke large-scale riots in the places of compact residence of the Alawites. They are located in the provinces of Latakia, Tartus, and the western part of the province of Homs. In the first half of 2025, such developments could seriously aggravate the territorial, political, and economic split of the country.❓